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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STA TE OF GEORGIA 
RASER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et aI., 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Civil Action File No. 
2012CV214140 
v. 
MORGAN STANLEY & CO., INC., et aI., 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TEMPORARILY STAY PROCEEDINGS 
PENDING A RELATED U.S SUPREME COURT DECISION 
Defendants move the COUl1 to temporarily stay the proceedings pending a decision in a 
case before the Supreme Court of the United States, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
et al. v. Manning, No. 14-1132 ("Manning"), 135 S. Ct. 2938, granting cert., June 30, 2015. In 
deciding whether to grant a temporary stay pending a decision of another proceeding case, 
Georgia law states: 
"The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 
control the disposition ofthe causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 
itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can be best done calls for the exercise of 
judgment, which must weigh competing interest and maintain an even balance." 
Bloomfieldv. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 230 Ga. 484, 486 (1973) (quoting Landis v. North 
American Company, 299 U.S 248, 254 (1936)). The Manning case is scheduled for oral 
arguments in December 1,2015, and Defendants anticipate that an opinion will be issued in 
March or April of 20 16. Plaintiffs oppose the motion to stay litigation. 
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants engaged in a practice called "naked Sh0l1 selling," which 
caused the unlawful manipulation of the price of Raser's common stock from the years 2003 to 
2011. Short selling stocks requires that the seller borrow the shares it purports to sell from 
another shareholder in a transaction typically arranged by a broker dealer, and those shares are 
then sold on the open market at the existing price and delivered to the buyer within three days. 
Short selling is federally regulated under Regulation SHO, 17 C.F.R. § 242.22 et seq., pursuant 
to the SEC's authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, "Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 
78a et seq. In a "naked" short sell, the seller does not own, and does not otherwise borrow, the 
securities it purports to "Sh01i" sell in time to make the delivery to the buyer within the requisite 
three days sale period. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' conduct essentially amounts to the 
creation of "phantom" shares, which are analogous to counterfeit money. This practice allegedly 
flooded the market with tens of millions of unauthorized and/or counterfeit Raser shares, which 
diluted the value of legitimate, authorized Raser shares, and thereby artificially depressed the 
price of those shares for Plaintiffs who bought, sold, and held Raser shares during the Relevant 
Period. 
Plaintiffs filed the instant action in April of 20 12, and in their most recent amended 
Complaint, I Plaintiffs allege violations of various states' securities laws and assert claims of 
racketeering. Defendants removed this case to the Northern District of Georgia on May 23, 
2012, contending that the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over this action because 
violations of federal securities laws and regulations, specifically the Exchange Act and 
Regulation SHO, in addition to violations of state securities laws, were pled as predicate acts in 
Plaintiffs' asserted state law RICO claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs argued, the claims were subject 
to federal jurisdiction because the claims were "arising from" a federal question under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and were subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction under a provision of the Exchange Act. 
However, on October 30,2012, Judge Orinda D. Evans remanded the case back to the Superior 
IOn June 26. 2015. Plaintiffs filed their Third Amendments to First Amended Complaint filed on February 8,2013. 
The Third Amendments added claims under other states' laws. including their RICO and securities laws for certain 
non-Georgia Plaintiffs and amended out other claims. 
2 
Court of Fulton County, concluding that reliance on the Exchange Act did not establish exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over state law claims but rather concurrent jurisdiction. 
The federal circuit courts are split' on whether state-law claims relying on the violation of 
federal securities law as a predicate act creates exclusive federal jurisdiction and the Supreme 
Court will be deciding this exact jurisdictional issue in the Merrill Lynch case. The question 
presented in the Manning case is "Whether § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides 
federal jurisdiction over state-law claims seeking to establish liability based on violations of the 
Act or its regulations or seeking to enforce duties created by the Act or its regulations." The 
allegations in the Manning case are nearly identical to those in the present case: the Manning 
plaintiffs allege that the defendants engaged in illegal naked Sh0l1 selling of their shares and the 
creation of these counterfeit shares depressed their stock value. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
asserts ten claims all arising under New Jersey state law, including a claim under New Jersey's 
RICO Act based on predicate acts of New Jersey securities fraud and theft. While the RICO 
claims rely on state law violations as predicate acts the plaintiffs also assert violations offederal 
law and Regulation SHO expressly and by implication. The District Court determined that the 
federal court had exclusive federal question jurisdiction and denied remand. Manning v. Merrill 
Lynch, 2013 WL 1164838 at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 20,2013). The Third Circuit reversed on appeal, 
concluding that no federal issue had been necessarily raised and the RICO claims were not 
necessarily predicated on violations of Regulation SHOo See Manning V. Merrill Lynch Pierce 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 158,163-64 (3d Cir. 2014). 
The Court agrees that if the Supreme Court in Manning follows the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits finding federal jurisdiction exists under the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the 
2 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have determined that § 27 provides federal jurisdiction over state-law claims seeking 
to establish liability based on violations off the Act or its regulations. The Third and Second Circuits have decided 
that §27 does not itself create federal jurisdiction over state-law claims. 
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Exchange Act, Defendants may again seek to remove the case to federal court. However, in 
weighing the competing interests of both parties with concerns regarding the efficiency of 
judicial time and resources, impact on public interest, and the ramification of postponement of 
the case, there has been no showing of prejudice in continuing the proceedings while the issue is 
finally decided. Plaintiffs have filed four Motions to Compel that have been stayed pending 
resolution of Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order filed October 5, 2015.3 The response to the 
Motion for Protective Order is due in early November. Also pending before the Court is 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Judgment on the Pleadings on, the 
Appealing Plaintiffs' Claims which was filed on August 14,2015. The parties have stipulated 
that reply briefing for this motion is not due until October 28,2015. Given that the briefing is 
nearly complete on most of the pending motions, the Court sees no reason to delay resolution of 
these motions before the Supreme Court issues its opinion in the Manning case. 
Thus, Defendants' motion to temporarily stay this proceeding pending a related U.S 
Supreme Court decision is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this V day of October, 2015. 
R,JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
3 Plaintiffs relied on the affidavit of non-party Michael Rosen in support of their four Motions to Compel. 
Defendants have subpoenaed Rosen for a deposition. Plaintiffs object to the deposition and filed their Motion for 
Protective Order. The COUIt entered its order on September 4,2015, extending the time for Defendants to respond 
to the Motions to Compel to the earlier of (I) 21 days after the Rosen deposition or (2) 21 days after an order that 
Rosen should not be deposed. 
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ROGERS & HARDIN LLP 
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Attorneys for Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith Incorporated 
Andrew J. Frackman 
Abby F. Rudzin 
Brad M. Elias 
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP 
Times Square Tower 
7 Times Square 
New York, New York 10036 
afrackman@omm.com 
arudzin@omm.com 
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Attorneys for Goldman, Sachs & Co. LLC 
Richard C. Pepperman, IT 
John G. McCalthy 
SULLIV AN & CROMWELL LLP 
125 Broad Street 
New York, New York 10004 
peppermanr@sullcrom.com 
mccalthyj@sullcrom.com 
Attorneys for Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC 
Jami Johnson 
Robert F. Wise, Jr. 
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